

July 19 2024 10:02 AM

CONSTANCE R. WHITE  
COUNTY CLERK  
**NO: 22-2-04332-1**

The Honorable André M. Peñalver  
Hearing Date: August 30, 2024  
Hearing Time: 9:00 a.m.

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON  
COUNTY OF PIERCE

SHELLY M. KNIGHT, DOUGLAS  
ZUKOWSKI, and HEATHER FARIS,  
individually and on behalf of all those  
similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

MULTICARE HEALTH SYSTEM, a  
Washington Nonprofit Corporation,

Defendant.

No. 22-2-04332-1

**PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR FINAL  
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION  
SETTLEMENT**

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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 After two and a half years of hard-fought litigation, Plaintiffs achieved a tremendous  
3 settlement for hourly healthcare workers in this case. The common fund settlement requires  
4 MultiCare Health System to pay \$39,000,000. This amount represents almost 150% of the wage  
5 loss calculated by Plaintiffs’ expert. The settlement is the result of Plaintiffs’ success in obtaining  
6 numerous favorable court rulings despite a tenacious defense. After this Court preliminarily  
7 approved the settlement as “fair, reasonable and adequate,” the settlement administrator sent a  
8 settlement notice with an individual estimated award to each Settlement Class Member. No  
9 Settlement Class Member has objected to the settlement to date.

10 There is no question that the settlement, the standard percentage fee and cost requests,  
11 and the service awards are fair, adequate, and reasonable under Washington law. Plaintiffs  
12 respectfully ask the Court to grant final approval of the settlement, approve the standard requests  
13 for attorneys’ fees, costs, settlement administration expenses, and service awards, and find the  
14 settlement administrator provided adequate notice.

15 **II. STATEMENT OF FACTS**

16 Plaintiffs brought this case on behalf of approximately 22,784 hourly employees who  
17 worked in MultiCare’s healthcare facilities during the class period. Plaintiffs alleged MultiCare  
18 violated Washington law by failing to provide second meal periods to non-hospital employees  
19 on shifts longer than 10.5 hours before April 24, 2022, and failing to pay for reported missed  
20 meal periods. In response, Defendant maintained that class members received the opportunity to  
21 take second meal periods but waived them and were not entitled to additional wages for reported  
22 missed meal periods because the company paid for work time during missed meal periods.

23 Plaintiffs outlined the facts in the preliminary approval motion, which this Court granted  
24 on June 7, 2024. Here, Plaintiffs summarize relevant facts for final approval.

25 Before reaching settlement, the parties engaged in more than two years of contentious,  
26 adversarial litigation. Defendant initially resisted providing class discovery, but Plaintiffs



1 motion, the declaration of Chantal Soto-Najera of CPT Group, and all papers filed in this action.

#### 2 IV. AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT

3 When considering final approval of a class action settlement, a court determines whether  
4 the settlement is “fair, adequate, and reasonable.” *Pickett v. Holland Am. Line-Westours, Inc.*,  
5 145 Wn.2d 178, 188, 35 P.3d 351 (2001). This is a “largely unintrusive inquiry.” *Id.* at 189.

6 Although the Court possesses some discretion in determining whether to approve a settlement,

7 the court’s intrusion upon what is otherwise a private consensual agreement  
8 negotiated between the parties to a lawsuit must be limited to the extent necessary  
9 to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or  
overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the  
settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.

10 *Id.* (internal quotation omitted). “[I]t must not be overlooked that voluntary conciliation and  
11 settlement are the preferred means of dispute resolution.” *Id.* at 190 (internal quotation omitted).

12 In evaluating whether a class settlement is “fair, adequate, and reasonable,” courts  
13 reference the following criteria: the likelihood of success by Plaintiffs; the amount of discovery  
14 or evidence; the settlement terms and conditions; the recommendation and experience of counsel;  
15 the future expense and likely duration of litigation; the recommendation of neutral parties, if any;  
16 the number of objectors and nature of objections; and the presence of good faith and absence of  
17 collusion. *Id.* at 188-89 (citing 2 Herbert B. Newberg & Alba Conte, *Newberg on Class Actions*  
18 § 11.43 (3d ed. 1992)). Here, the settlement easily meets the criteria for final approval.

#### 19 A. The settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.

##### 20 1. Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success supports final approval.

21 The existence of risk and uncertainty to Plaintiffs and the Settlement Class “weighs  
22 heavily in favor of a finding that the settlement was fair, adequate, and reasonable.” *Id.* at 192.

23 In the absence of settlement, the workers would have faced multiple hurdles to relief, including  
24 Defendant’s request and likely subsequent motion for decertification of the classes, Defendant’s  
25 arguments in opposition to the motion for partial summary judgment on damages, disputes  
26 regarding Plaintiffs’ expert’s calculations of damages, a jury trial, and an appeal by Defendant.

1 Defendant maintained that its meal break practices complied with the law. If Defendant were to  
2 succeed on this argument on appeal, the workers would recover nothing.

3 Furthermore, there is risk inherent in any jury trial. If Defendant were able to convince a  
4 jury that Plaintiffs' expert's damages calculations were incorrect, Defendant could effectively  
5 reduce the recoverable damages. Furthermore, the jury (or this Court) could have rejected  
6 Plaintiffs' assumptions regarding damages calculations, significantly limiting recovery.

7 Plaintiffs also considered the risk of decertification of the classes. If Defendant had  
8 succeeded in seeking decertification, it would have left Plaintiffs to pursue individual claims and  
9 would have allowed no recovery for 22,781 other workers.

10 Ultimately, the most important consideration for settlement was the delay inherent in a  
11 likely appeal. Even if Plaintiffs maintained class certification and established damages for  
12 Defendant's meal break violations, any recovery could have been delayed for years by an appeal,  
13 and an appellate court could ultimately reverse the favorable summary judgment rulings  
14 Plaintiffs obtained. *See Cooper v. AlSCO*, 186 Wn.2d 357, 370-71, 376 P.3d 382 (2016) (reversing  
15 summary judgment in favor of class of drivers who asserted wage claims and remanding for entry  
16 of judgment in favor of employer). The settlement eliminates all these risks and provides  
17 substantial compensation to Settlement Class Members without delay.

18 2. The settlement terms and conditions support final approval.

19 Defendant agreed to pay \$39 million for a common fund settlement. This is an  
20 unprecedented settlement in Washington for a case solely involving meal break claims. If the  
21 Court approves the allocations, workers will share in more than \$27,040,000. Pizl Decl. ¶4.

22 "A possibility that the settlement could have been better does not mean it was not fair,  
23 reasonable, or adequate." *Summers v. Sea Mar Community Health Centers*, 29 Wn. App. 2d 476,  
24 504, 541 P.3d 381 (2024) (affirming approval of class settlement with awards "up to  
25 approximately \$3.66 per class member"). "A proposed settlement is not judged against a  
26 hypothetical or speculative measure of what might have been achieved." *Id.* The significant relief



1 Plaintiffs obtained for the Settlement Class—likely the largest class settlement in state history  
2 for a case involving only meal break claims—is well within the range of wage and hour class  
3 settlements that have been found fair and reasonable by other courts. Indeed, in *Koshman v.*  
4 *MultiCare Health System*, a case involving rounding claims and second meal break claims for  
5 hospital employees, the court approved a settlement (including a 30% fee) in which employees  
6 received roughly 48% of their wages lost due to missed second meal breaks. King County  
7 Superior Court Case No. 20-2-15648-5 SEA (July 26, 2022, Rittereiser Decl. at ¶18). Here,  
8 Settlement Class Members will receive more than 100% of their lost meal break wages as  
9 calculated by Plaintiffs’ expert. Pizl Decl., ¶4. This is an exceptional result.

10 The average class member award is expected to be almost \$1,200. *See id.* ¶6. The largest  
11 awards are expected to be more than \$40,000. *Id.* ¶7. Based on the risks and likelihood of  
12 appellate delays, these payments represent an excellent result for class members.

13 In assessing the fairness of a class settlement, courts also examine whether there is  
14 equitable treatment “between class members.” *Pickett*, 145 Wn.2d at 189. Here, settlement funds  
15 will be allocated in an equitable manner. Without needing to file a claim form, each Settlement  
16 Class Member will receive an award from the Class Fund based on their potential meal break  
17 damages. Pizl Decl. ¶8. The damages for the First Meal Period Class will be based on each class  
18 member’s number of reported missed meal breaks and hourly rate. Cote Decl., Ex. 1 at V.4.c.  
19 The damages for the Second Meal Period Class will be based on each class member’s number of  
20 shifts over 10.5 hours before April 24, 2022 and hourly rate. *Id.* This approach ensures employees  
21 who missed more meal breaks will receive larger shares.

22 No settlement funds will revert to Defendant under any circumstances. *See id.*, Ex. 1 at  
23 V.9.k. If any settlement check remains uncashed after 120 days, the funds will be sent to the  
24 Washington Unclaimed Property Fund in the class member’s name. *Id.* at V.9.k. Any funds  
25 remaining in the Reserve Fund after 180 days will be paid to the Legal Foundation of Washington  
26 (50%) and Washington Healthcare Access Alliance (50%). *Id.* at V.7.

1 Finally, the release of claims is limited. To receive a settlement payment, Settlement Class  
2 Members release only claims for missed meal periods or other alleged violations of the meal  
3 period regulation, WAC 296-126-092(1)-(3), through April 1, 2024. *Id.* at V.1.q, V.2.

4 3. The amount of discovery and evidence supports final approval.

5 Where “extensive discovery” takes place before a class settlement, final approval is  
6 favored. *See Pickett*, 145 Wn.2d at 199. Here, the settlement is the result of lengthy efforts over  
7 a two-year period to obtain sufficient discovery and extensive adversarial litigation. Cote Decl.  
8 ¶¶3-14. Discovery included the production and review of over 94,000 pages of documents, 80  
9 declarations, almost 100 million data records, 11 depositions, and numerous class member  
10 interviews. Pizl Decl. ¶¶9-10. Class Counsel’s team of legal professionals at two firms spent  
11 extensive time over a two-year period collecting evidence, reviewing and analyzing documents  
12 and data, interviewing class members, and analyzing and litigating the legal claims. Pizl Decl.  
13 ¶¶10-12; Cote Decl. ¶¶3-9. Class Counsel also conducted four CR 30(b)(6) depositions. Cote  
14 Decl. ¶7. Counsel also spent weeks working with expert witness Aaron Mitchell on his damages  
15 model, which was based on massive datasets from MultiCare. Pizl Decl. ¶13. After extensive  
16 discovery and litigation, including a partial summary judgment ruling in favor of Plaintiffs and  
17 the classes, counsel were well-prepared to negotiate a strong settlement.

18 4. The positive recommendation and extensive experience of counsel and the  
19 neutral mediator support final approval.

20 “When experienced and skilled class counsel support a settlement, their views are given  
21 great weight.” *Pickett*, 145 Wn.2d at 200. Class Counsel, who are experienced and skilled in class  
22 action litigation, support the settlement as fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the best interests of  
23 the Settlement Class. Cote Decl. ¶¶15-16; Pizl Decl. ¶¶14-15. Furthermore, Washington courts  
24 consider the “recommendation of neutral parties, if any.” *Pickett*, 145 Wn.2d at 188. Here, neutral  
25 mediator Lou Peterson proposed the \$39 million common fund settlement in a mediator’s  
26 proposal after a full day of negotiations. Cote Decl. ¶12.

1           5.     Future expense and likely duration of litigation support final approval.

2           The future expense and likely duration of litigation had a settlement not been reached also  
3 support final approval. *Pickett*, 145 Wn.2d at 188. The Court must consider whether, absent  
4 settlement, “class members would have incurred significant delay in receiving the relief to which  
5 they are entitled pursuant to the agreement.” *Deien v. Seattle City Light*, 26 Wn. App. 2d 57, 72,  
6 527 P.3d 102 (2023). Here, the settlement guarantees immediate relief for the workers while  
7 avoiding the delay of further litigation, trial, and a lengthy appeal process. At the time of  
8 mediation, Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment on class damages was pending and  
9 trial was upcoming, which would have taken extensive time and resources. Even if Plaintiffs  
10 prevailed against Defendant on their pending summary judgment motion or at trial, Defendant  
11 was certain to appeal adverse rulings, which would delay relief to class members for years.

12           6.     The reaction of the class supports final approval.

13           A court may infer a class action settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable when few  
14 class members object to it. *See Pickett*, 145 Wn.2d at 200-01. Here, the deadline to opt out or  
15 object to the settlement is August 2, 2024. As of July 18, no Settlement Class Member has  
16 objected and only one has opted out. Pizl Decl. ¶18; CPT Decl. ¶¶12-13. Plaintiffs will update  
17 this information and respond to any objections by August 16, 2024.

18           7.     The presence of good faith and absence of collusion support final  
19                 approval.

20           In determining the fairness of a settlement, the Court may also consider the presence of  
21 good faith and absence of collusion. *Pickett*, 145 Wn.2d at 201. Here, there has been no collusion  
22 or bad faith. The settlement is the result of extensive negotiations between experienced attorneys,  
23 which took place after more than two years of hard-fought litigation, substantial discovery, and  
24 extensive document review and analysis. Cote Decl. ¶¶3-15. At all times, the negotiations leading  
25 to the settlement were adversarial, non-collusive, and at arm’s length. *Id.* ¶14.

26           **B.     Settlement Class Members received the best notice practicable.**

          This Court already determined the notice program meets the requirements of due process

1 and applicable law and provides the best notice practicable to Settlement Class Members.  
2 Preliminary Approval Order, ¶4. The settlement administrator, CPT Group, has successfully  
3 implemented the notice program. *See* CPT Decl. ¶¶4-11. After this Court granted preliminary  
4 approval, Defendant provided the names of Settlement Class Members, last known addresses,  
5 email addresses, and social security numbers. Pizl Decl. ¶2. Defendant also provided additional  
6 timekeeping and meal period attestation data, as required by the settlement agreement. *Id.* ¶3.  
7 Using data produced by Defendant, Class Counsel calculated estimated settlement awards, and  
8 CPT Group formatted settlement notices with individualized estimated awards for each  
9 Settlement Class Member. *Id.*; CPT Decl. ¶¶5, 8. CPT Group sent notice by mail using the most  
10 recent contact information available. CPT Decl. ¶¶5-8. As of July 17, 83 mailed notices were  
11 returned as undeliverable. *Id.* ¶10. As a result of skip trace efforts or remail requests from counsel  
12 or the Class Members themselves, 77 notices had been remailed as of July 17. *Id.* ¶11. CPT Group  
13 also issued notice by email to Settlement Class Members for whom MultiCare provided an email  
14 address and set up a settlement website with key documents and information. *Id.* ¶¶3, 8.

15 **C. The requested attorneys’ fees award is customary and reasonable.**

16 Where attorneys have obtained a common fund settlement for the benefit of a class,  
17 Washington courts use the “percentage of recovery approach” in calculating and awarding  
18 attorneys’ fees. *Bowles v. Dep’t of Ret. Sys.*, 121 Wn.2d 52, 72, 847 P.2d 440 (1993). Because  
19 this is a common fund settlement, the “percentage of recovery approach” applies. *See id.* “Under  
20 the percentage of recovery approach . . . attorneys are compensated according to the size of the  
21 benefit conferred, not the actual hours expended.” *Lyzanchuk v. Yakima Ranches Owners Ass’n,*  
22 *Phase II, Inc.*, 73 Wn. App. 1, 12, 866 P.2d 695 (1994). The Washington Supreme Court has  
23 recognized, “[i]n common fund cases, the size of the recovery constitutes a suitable measure of  
24 the attorneys’ performance.” *Bowles*, 121 Wn.2d at 72. Public policy supports this approach:  
25 “When attorney fees are available to prevailing class action plaintiffs, plaintiffs will have less  
26 difficulty obtaining counsel and greater access to the judicial system. Little good comes from a

1 system where justice is available only to those who can afford its price.” *Id.* at 71.

2 Contingency fees in individual cases are usually in the range of 33 to 40 percent. *See*  
3 *Forbes v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Co. W.*, 170 Wn.2d 157, 161-66, 240 P.3d 790 (2010) (discussing  
4 contingency fees between 33 1/3 percent and 44 percent and reinstating trial court’s order that  
5 “40 percent contingency fee based on the \$5 million settlement was fair and reasonable”). The  
6 typical range for attorneys’ fees awarded in common fund class action settlements is between 20  
7 and 33 percent. *See* 4 Newberg on Class Actions § 14.6 (4th ed. 2002) (recognizing “fee awards  
8 in class actions average around one-third of the recovery”); *Bowles*, 121 Wn.2d at 72 (noting fee  
9 awards for common fund cases are often in range of 20 to 30 percent).

10 Here, Class Counsel request approval of a 30 percent fee. This is below the contingency  
11 fee range for individual cases and consistent with percentage fee awards in other employment  
12 law class actions. Indeed, Washington courts routinely approve fee awards of 30 to 35 percent of  
13 the common fund in class actions. *See* Cote Decl., Ex. 2 (list of more than 60 class cases in which  
14 Washington courts have approved fee awards of between 30 and 35 percent of the common fund);  
15 Pizl Decl. ¶16. Judges in Pierce County Superior Court and across the state have repeatedly  
16 approved 30 percent fee awards for wage-and-hour class settlements, including numerous cases  
17 in which the results achieved were much less significant than in this case. *See id.* Thus, the fee  
18 request here is reasonable under the “percentage of recovery” method.

19 Settlement Class Members received notices stating counsel would request a fee up to 30  
20 percent, and no Settlement Class Member has objected to that amount to date. Pizl Decl. ¶17.

21 The excellent result counsel achieved supports a 30% fee. Plaintiffs’ expert calculated an  
22 actual wage loss of approximately \$26.5 million. *See id.* ¶4. Solely as a result of Class Counsel’s  
23 work, the classes have obtained a \$39 million settlement. This result alone justifies counsel’s  
24 request. *Bowles*, 121 Wn.2d at 72 (“In common fund cases, the size of the recovery constitutes a  
25 suitable measure of the attorneys’ performance.”). Without counsel’s diligent work pursuing  
26 class discovery, obtaining class certification, winning a ruling granting partial summary

1 judgment on liability, and defeating defendant’s partial summary judgment motion, class  
2 members would have recovered nothing. As a result of counsel’s work, class members will  
3 recover virtually all their wage loss. Courts regularly award 30% or more in attorneys’ fees even  
4 where counsel’s efforts secure only a fraction of the class’s actual damages. *See* Pizl Decl. ¶16;  
5 Cote Decl., Ex. 2. It would be anomalous to deny a standard 30% fee here, where Class Counsel  
6 secured virtually a full recovery of class members’ wage loss.

7         A 30 percent fee is appropriate considering the circumstances of the case. While any class  
8 action is risky, the case presented unique challenges that could have resulted in no recovery for  
9 the class if this Court had denied class certification or accepted Defendant’s position that it  
10 provided adequate compensation for missed meal breaks by paying for the meal break time. Pizl  
11 Decl. ¶19. Nonetheless, Class Counsel took the risk of litigating the case on a contingency basis  
12 and advanced more than \$100,000 in costs. Pizl Decl. ¶¶19-22; Cote Decl. ¶¶18-21. Based on  
13 the risks, there was a real possibility Class Counsel would recover nothing for their work.  
14 Nonetheless, counsel took their charge seriously and endeavored to represent the interests of the  
15 workers to the greatest extent possible for two and a half years without compensation. As a result  
16 of the tenacious approach taken by Defendant’s legal team (including multiple in-house attorneys  
17 and a team of lawyers at Stoel Rives), Class Counsel needed a team of more than ten legal  
18 professionals at two firms to litigate the case successfully. *See* Pizl Decl. ¶11; Cote Decl. ¶21.

19         A standard 30% fee recognizes the financial risk Class Counsel took in litigating this case  
20 on a contingency fee basis for two and a half years. Counsel achieved an excellent result at great  
21 personal financial risk—dedicating much of their work life to this case for more than two years.  
22 Indeed, co-lead counsel Marc Cote dedicated approximately 70% of his litigation practice to this  
23 case since appearing in 2022. Cote Decl. ¶20. As a result of their duties to the class members,  
24 counsel had to forgo other work, despite the financial risk. *Id.* ¶20; Pizl Decl. ¶22.

25         A 30% fee is further justified by the duration and complexity of the litigation and scope  
26 of discovery. This was a complex case involving 22,784 class members. Class Counsel worked

1 diligently throughout the case with no guarantee of being compensated. Counsel engaged in  
2 substantial discovery, carefully crafted persuasive class certification and summary judgment  
3 briefing supported by extensive evidence, and worked with an expert to construct a class damages  
4 model that incorporated voluminous datasets. Armed with extensive data and documents, counsel  
5 carefully negotiated a settlement that will provide a meaningful remedy for all class members.

6 For these reasons, Class Counsel ask that this Court approve a 30 percent fee award.

7 **D. Reimbursement of Class Counsel’s litigation costs is reasonable.**

8 For common fund settlements, litigation costs are awarded in addition to percentage fee  
9 awards. *See Bowles*, 121 Wn.2d at 70-74 (affirming common fund fee award and separate costs  
10 award). “Reasonable costs and expenses incurred by an attorney who creates or preserves a  
11 common fund are reimbursed proportionately by those class members who benefit from the  
12 settlement.” *In re Media Vision Tech. Sec. Litig.*, 913 F. Supp. 1362, 1366 (N.D. Cal. 1996). The  
13 settlement notice issued to class members stated that Class Counsel would seek up to \$120,000  
14 in litigation expenses. To date, Class Counsel have incurred \$109,638.98 in litigation expenses.  
15 Cote Decl. ¶18, Ex. 3; Pizl Decl. ¶21, Ex. A. These expenses include filing fees, service fees,  
16 expert witness fees, hearing transcript costs, Westlaw expenses, deposition expenses, class notice  
17 costs, and mediation expenses. *Id.* The expenses were reasonable and necessary to secure the  
18 successful resolution of this litigation. *See In re Immune Response Sec. Litig.*, 497 F. Supp. 2d  
19 1166, 1177-78 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (finding costs such as filing fees, online legal research fees, and  
20 mediation expenses are relevant and necessary expenses in class action litigation). Thus, Class  
21 Counsel request reimbursement of \$109,638.98 for litigation expenses.

22 **E. The settlement administration expenses award is reasonable.**

23 The settlement agreement provides for payment of no more than \$95,000 in settlement  
24 administration expenses. Cote Decl., Ex. 1 at V.8.d. CPT Group is required to establish a  
25 Qualified Settlement Fund, create a settlement website, format settlement notices with estimated  
26 awards, mail and email notices, handle undeliverable notices and skip traces, calculate tax

1 withholdings, issue taxes to the appropriate government entities, process settlement payments,  
2 and handle tax reporting duties. *See id.* at V.8-9. The administration expenses are reasonable and  
3 necessary to inform Settlement Class Members of the settlement and ensure it is administered  
4 fairly. Plaintiffs request approval of settlement administration expenses not to exceed \$95,000.

5 **F. The class representative service awards are reasonable.**

6 Service awards compensate class representatives for work done on behalf of the class.  
7 *Tuttle v. Audiophile Music Direct, Inc.*, C22-1081JLR, 2023 WL 8891575, at \*15 (W.D. Wash.  
8 Dec. 26, 2023) (recognizing “[s]ervice awards are commonplace in class actions”). These awards  
9 promote the public policy of encouraging individuals to undertake the responsibility of  
10 representative lawsuits. *See id.* The requested awards of \$15,000 for each Plaintiff class  
11 representative are reasonable and in line with awards approved by other courts. *See, e.g., Hughes*  
12 *v. Microsoft Corp.*, C93-0178C, 2001 WL 34089697, at \*12 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 26, 2001)  
13 (approving service awards of \$7,500, \$25,000, and \$40,000). Plaintiffs responded to Defendant’s  
14 discovery requests, testified in depositions, communicated regularly with Class Counsel, and  
15 participated in a full-day mediation. They also assisted Class Counsel in understanding the  
16 underlying facts. Cote Decl. ¶22. The service awards will compensate Plaintiffs for their  
17 extensive time and effort in stepping forward to serve as class representatives and the  
18 reputational and occupational risks they faced by suing a powerful hospital system. The awards  
19 are well deserved and should be approved.

20 **V. CONCLUSION**

21 The common fund settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. Moreover, it is appropriate  
22 for the Court to approve a 30% fee award, \$109,638.98 for costs, an amount not to exceed  
23 \$95,000 for settlement administration expenses, and service awards of \$15,000 for each class  
24 representative. Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant final approval.



1 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED AND DATED this 19th day of July 2024.

2  
3 ENTENTE LAW PLLC

FRANK FREED SUBIT & THOMAS LLP

4 By: *s/ James B. Pizl*

By: *s/ Marc C. Cote*

5 James B. Pizl, WSBA #28969

Marc C. Cote, WSBA #39824

6 315 39th Ave SW, Suite 14

Jack N. Miller, WSBA #57007

7 Puyallup, WA 98373

Ellicott K. Dandy, WSBA #57279

8 P: 253-446-7668

705 Second Avenue, Suite 1200

9 F: 253-251-1276

Seattle, WA 98104

10 Email: [jim@ententelaw.com](mailto:jim@ententelaw.com)

11 P: 206-682-6711

12 F: 206-682-0401

13 Email: [mcote@frankfreed.com](mailto:mcote@frankfreed.com)

14 Email: [jmiller@frankfreed.com](mailto:jmiller@frankfreed.com)

15 Email: [edandy@frankfreed.com](mailto:edandy@frankfreed.com)

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26  
*Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Classes*

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I, Hannelore Ohaus, certify and state as follows:

1. I am a citizen of the United States and a resident of the state of Washington; I am over the age of 18 years and not a party of the within entitled cause. I am employed by the law firm of Frank Freed Subit & Thomas LLP, whose address is 705 Second Avenue, Suite 1200, Seattle, Washington 98104.

2. I caused the foregoing document to be served upon counsel of record at the address and in the manner described below, on July 19, 2024.

Timothy J. O’Connell, WSBA #15372	<input type="checkbox"/> U.S. Mail
Christopher T. Wall, WSBA # 45873	
Mark O. Morgan, WSBA #52006	<input type="checkbox"/> ABC Legal Messenger
Aaron R. Doyer, WSBA #60095	
STOEL RIVES LLP	<input type="checkbox"/> Facsimile
600 University Street, Suite 3600	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> E-Mail
Seattle, WA 98101	
Tel: (206) 624-0900	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Via the Pierce County
Fax: (206) 386-7500	Electronic Filing System
Email: <a href="mailto:tim.oconnell@stoel.com">tim.oconnell@stoel.com</a>	
Email: <a href="mailto:christopher.wall@stoel.com">christopher.wall@stoel.com</a>	
Email: <a href="mailto:mark.morgan@stoel.com">mark.morgan@stoel.com</a>	
Email: <a href="mailto:aaron.doyer@stoel.com">aaron.doyer@stoel.com</a>	

*Attorneys for Defendant*

I hereby declare under the penalty of perjury of the laws of the State of Washington that the foregoing is true and correct.

DATED at Seattle, Washington on this 19th day of July 2024.

s/ Hannelore Ohaus  
Hannelore Ohaus